Abstract: is there such a thing as European private law, a set of rules of EU law distinguished by the binary opposition public and private law? This article aims to shed light on the debate over the rise and the fall of the classic concept of private law and how the legal consciousness of the latter enhanced the legal awareness of European private law. Philosophy and sociology of law claim reasons in the search for answers, from a metaphysical and epistemological points of view. Furthermore, the reality of private law in practice put the ancient concepts in challenge by the phenomena of transnationalization of Law. Globalization, europanization, and the privatization of private Law are factual claims against the persistence of the classic concept of private law. These categories reveal the inconsistences between the theory of will in books and law in practice, suggesting that pluralism can face the lack of sense of a universal model of private law to all the realities involved in the European Union. The belief that the harmonization (or systematization) of national Civil Codes at the European level would lead to the coherence of private law is one of the bases to a final question about the extent to which the persistence of the classic concept of private law among legal scholarship is still an obstacle to the effectiveness of EU integration through the combination of public and private enforcement.
Introduction
Is there such a thing as European private law; a set of rules of EU law distinguished by the binary opposition public and private law? And if so, is this conceptual distinction anyhow functional to the way in which lawyers perceive or operate in plural legal systems? Over the years of research in the field of European Union (EU) law, I have continued searching for meaningful answers to these questions.
2 By doing so, I witnessed two opposite reactions to the question of whether European private law is such a thing. On one side are those who think these are the meaningful questions; on the other are those who dismiss them.
Between dismissals and acceptance of the European private law as a thing, there is a learned lesson. The reason for the opposite reactions does not lie in the genuine disagreement of whether the substantive dimension suggested as European private law exist or not; or undertakings based on the nationality of the controlling shareholder), harmed individuals could challenge violations before national Civil Courts through private legal remedies such as financial compensations.
Two intellectual developments have long contested the classic concept of private law during the 20 th century: one based on philosophy of law and committed to challenge formalism; the other bringing a perspective from the sociology of law. Both intellectual developments, underpinned by metaphysical and epistemological reasons respectively, converge into one conclusion: the classic concept of private law is dead; or must be so.
The modern concept of private law, instead, departs from the definition of private law according to its subjects. Private law is defined as any rule applied to the subject of contracts, torts, property, and associations. Regardless of whether the provision is found in a civil code, a Decree-Law issued by a regulator, trade agreements, or a sophisticated transnational legal system like the EU, what defines them as a rule of private law is the commonality of a regulated subject. Therefore, the modern concept rejects the misleading definition of private law as power-conferring rules intended to protect the will of parties only. But it also reveals private law as a set of duty-imposing rules enshrining duties 7 on individuals to make transactions under obligations of non-discriminate, or fair competition, and other legal obligations embedded on a plurality of moral ethics ranging from utilitarian, social, to autonomous-based values.
8
To understand the relevance of the modern concept of private law to legal practice, EU law does matters. The EU legal system is the epitome of a transnational legal system grounded in a policy-oriented mandate: the creation of an integrated and competitive transnational market. To pursue its mandate, the EU has advanced a set of rules regarding product liability, rights to withdraw, information duties, and other duties and rights governing contracts, property, and liability. These rules make the private law dimension of EU law uncontestable. The legal consciousness of the private law dimension of EU law matters. For instance, a right to withdrawal established at transnational level is only effective if legal practitioners share a certain level of legal consciousness about those rights to enforce them in private disputes. 9 This is the reason for beginning this chapter by quoting Wittgenstein's book "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus": "most questions and propositions of the philosopher result from the fact that we do not understand the logic of our language".
The paper has three parts. The first part (1) introduces the problem of how different concepts of private law have hampered genuine discussions on European private law in the context of the Draft Common Frame of Reference (hereinafter DCFR). It also introduces the first hints of claims developed in the next two subsections on why the classic concept of private law needs to be reviewed. The second part (2) of this chapter borrows a genealogical account from legal historians and philosophers to understand the origins of the classic concept of private. This sets the groundwork for the subsequent map of arguments raised by two different intellectual projects that both end by deconstructing this classic way of thinking:
one based on the philosophy of law (2.1), and the other on the sociology of law (2.2). The latter intellectual development is then subdivided in two more subsections to observe the phenomenon of the transformation of private law: one that explains the transformation of private law within and by States (2.2.1), the other that observes the transformation of private law beyond States (2.2.2). The third part (3) then raise a question about the extent to which the persistence of the classic concept of private law among legal scholarship is still an obstacle to the effectiveness of EU integration through the combination of public and private enforcement.
Breaking paradigms: Draft Common Frame of Reference and the awakening of the

European private lawyers
The beginning of the 21 st century was also the beginning of a new round of debates among private lawyers in Europe motivated by the Commission's audacious plan to draft the European civil code. Before it, the last two decades of the 20 th century were marked by the academic debate about the EU's bold move from solely negative integration towards the political process of positive integration. 10 Rules on consumer and company law were seen as the most advanced intervention of EU law into private law. The second layer of arguments contra the DCFR challenged the normative approach to private law as a coherent system of norms based on deontological-autonomous virtuous.
The DCFR established four principles as fundamental principles of European contract law:
contractual freedom, security, justice, and efficiency. One could claim that the four fundamental principles are conflictual by themselves. By stressing the horizontal dimension of pluralism in European private Law, Norbert Reich, and Hans Micklitz questioned the "four main European
Contract law principles" of the DCFR by shedding light on the already existing "pluralism of -possibly conflicting -principles in private law and the EU on which the DCFR is based".
18
In parallel, the Study Group of private legal scholars published a paper entitled "Social Justice 17 Leone Niglia argues that the DCFR does not reproduce the hierarchical and formalistic thought of 19 th century, which eliminates from the legal frame anything that is plural. For Niglia, it is a new way in which "formalism has been rearranged to meet the contingent policy demands coming from the European Commission. What matters in this perspective is the morality of the universal values that are presumed to be the best for ruling the plurality of legal orders". Niglia, Leone. "Pluralism in a New Key: Between Plurality and Normativity." In Pluralism and European Private Law, edited by Leone Niglia. Oxford: Hart, 2013, p. 250-251 . See also Niglia, Leone. "The Question Concerning the Common Frame of Reference. " European Law Journal 18, no. 6 (2012 over into legal practice. Teaching private law categorically as means to autonomy-based value or neutrality inhibits lawyers from thinking about private law through a broader lens. It presents private law as an apolitical or neutral body of law when in fact the whole substance of private law reflects political choices and moral values. This is the truth that explains rules protecting individuals will written in testaments, rules determining contractual capacity above or below a certain age, which by the way were denied to women just a few decades ago, 27 and rules avoiding slayers to profit from wrongdoing.
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In opposition to the classic concept of private law, an acute awareness of the incompatibility between private law in books and private law in practice has pushed the agenda on the modernization (or transformation) of private law thinking. Scholars claim there is a need to reconnect the theory of private law with what private law is within and beyond States. Rather than having a concept of private law define the feature of its rules (i.e. systematic and coherent) or restrain its ends to one value or no value, the modern concept of private law has two dimensions. It embraces the concept that first identifies the subject of private law, and further provides conceptual tools to validate the law regulating the subject, rules and values.
Andrew Burrows provides us with a very precise and succinct account of the subject of private law.
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"The law of Property defines the boundaries of our rightful possessions, while the law of torts seeks to make us whole against violations of those boundaries, as well as against violations of the natural boundaries of our physical person. Contract law ratifies and enforces our joint ventures beyond these boundaries"
If the private law is dynamic, the concept of private law firstly refers to its subject (i.e.
contract, property, tort, and association), rather than the feature of its rules. Secondly, private law, as any other law, has to pass through a validity test based on social rules of recognition.
Gregory Klass define rules of contract law as the combination of two pictures. 30 He refers to private law as a combination of power-conferring rules and duty-imposing rules.
A similar approach to private law can be found in Dyerck Beyleveld and Roger 
Deconstructing the Classic Concept within and beyond States: Two Intellectual Developments, One Conclusion
The classic concept of private law does not belong to any ancient theory of law or private law. On contrary, it was brought with a 19 th century codification project of national civil codes and, since it, has persisted as the mainstream way of thinking about private law within national legal systems. 35 The classic concept of private law derives from a well-succeed intellectual movement that intentionally defined private law as a system of rules based on the virtuous of autonomy (i.e. as a means to protect the parties will) as the normative framework of a coherent, hierarchical and monistic system is and must be challenged in legal scholarship and legal practice. State, yet that it needs to be adapted to the continuous transformations of the State in modern and postmodern societies.
Adjusting Theory to Realism by Philosophers of Law
The first intellectual development arguing for the modernization of private law thinking arose among legal philosophers who refused both the epistemological and the metaphysical proposition of private law on arguments that goes far from features of what private law is in practice. Put simply, the first intellectual development sees classic private legal thinking as a patient that has become ill with a condition of cognitive distortions. This is the reason why they do not claim to be in favor of the transformation of private law, but rather they favor the transformation of classic private law thought.
There are two schools of legal thought that undermine the foundation of the classic theory of private Law: legal realism, and critical legal studies. For legal realists, describing private law as an autonomous system based on the supremacy of the will of the parties is founded on an erroneous formalistic approach to law. If legal theories must represent the metaphysical views of the world, an empiricist proves that there have always been
propositions of law solving substantive legal issues that are based on opposite rhetorical modes: individualism and altruism. 43 As it stands, the claim that private law is not in the service of any external moral obligation is metaphysically and epistemologically debatable.
This is the core point of departure for those who claim there is a disconnect between the "law in books with law in action". 
Adjusting Theory to the Transformation of the State by Sociologist of Law
Rather than rejecting the foundations of classic private law thinking as a theoretical construction, the second intellectual development perceived it as a legal doctrine conforming 54 The claim of private legal scholars in middle 20 th century for the modernization of private law thinking could not be better represented than the words written by Franz Wieacker in 1952. "When the exercise of its classical institutions does involve the use of economic or social power, the question of the role and the status of private law in the social state under the role of law arise starkly. Here too the Basic Law in Western Germany irrefragably guarantees rights of ownership and inheritance, and also, according to the prevalent and correct interpretation of its second and tenth article, freedom of contract: consistently with traditional individual rights, these are the freedom of individual choices. At the same time the social function of contract, economic rights, land ownership, capital the means of production, and economic association in our present system is undeniable: unlike the entrepreneurial economy the social economy sees them as a means of ensuring the distribution of sources, the creation of assets, and the maintenance of the necessities of life are affected in a just manner. 58 Ramsey Pricing are temporary mandatory rules imposed to every transaction of electricity wholesale throughout a certain period of time, when high demand picks increases excessively revenues of producers for natural accidents or some sort of market failure. Cap prices are regulatory mechanism imposed by States on market actors. Differently from traditional protective measures of consumer law, these rules aim is to protect demand-side.
as hybrid law. The same argument was extended to justify the exclusion of market regulation rules from the branch of private law to a sort of economic/administrative law.
When the Will Theorist marginalized this set of rules based on social values from what they perceive as the "pure private law", it provoked not only the rupture between private law in books and law in action, but it also provoked a negative impact upon the latter. The impact upon legal practice happens where there is a lack of legal consciousness among individuals about their rights and duties and how to privately enforce them. If regulation enshrines duties of contracts applied to two persons making transactions, the non-compliance with dutyimposing could hold complaints based on private remedies (e.g. breach of contract). The lack of legal consciousness, therefore, diminishes the effectiveness of the legal systems.
The outer face of States: Globalization, Europeanization, and Europeanization of Private Law
If explaining the transformation of States together with the transformation of private law is a way to deconstruct the classic concept within States, this exercise is harder when the objective is deconstructing the classic thought of law beyond States.
There is one reason why international lawyers are even more resistant to the modern where law needs to be dynamic as much as technology changes.
Being Law a social phenomenon, globalization demands transnational rules to govern global movement of goods, services and people. 64 Transnational law emerged then, and have become a field of research that has attracted massive attention from scholars. Scholars who were rooted in the traditional fields of law -constitutional law, administrative law, private law -have made efforts to understand the phenomenon of transnational law, but they did so sometimes transposing classic concepts of their disciplines to the transnational level. 65 As a result, some studies on the attempt to understand transnational law fail for transposing to the global arena the black-box model; the classic divisions of public and private law.
Transnational law, therefore, has exposed even more the fragile foundations of the classic concept of private law. Globalization has led to a disorder of orders 66 and somebody inside the black-box cannot discern the lack of conformity between theories of law and law in action in this global era.
In 85 It is undisputable that the Euro-crisis and Gauweiler case revived the discussion about whether the EU legal system could still be conceived as a Constitutional plural order. Some scholars have argued that the decision of CJEU on the OMT's policy represents a new stage of constitutionalism of the EU towards a fully monist order. However, this article is in agreement with scholars who see it as foregone conclusion. CJEU's judgement in favour of the legality of the OMT emission was referred by the German Constitutional Court, which is still holding powers to review CJEU decisions in strict circumstances (ultra-virus review, human rights review, and identify review). If indeed the German Constitutional Court decided to follow the CJEU in such controversial case, it could be seen as a treat to the European Plural Constitutional, but any conclusion is no more than speculations. C-62-14. 87 In an era where more and more transnational legal systems emerge with policy-driven competence to build free and common markets, the EU experience will serve as blue print.
These new Integration Projects replicate European negative integration and, sometimes, even positive integration (e.g. TTIP and TTP). 88 If one agrees that the European Integration Project will unavoidably spill over into private law, lessons from European Private Law on how to understand these modes of transnationalization of private law are worthwhile. 89 See the infant project of Hans-W. Micklitz (2015) .
